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While a political consensus has emerged to increase aid flows to Sub-Saharan Africa, empirical studies of the 
effectiveness of aid in stimulating growth and reducing poverty have yet to yield conclusive results. The 
present paper takes a different approach. Using the standard neoclassical growth model, we ask how much 
should be expected from aid a priori. Using a range of different parameter values and model specifications, 
we address three questions. (i) How much growth should aid flows have produced in Sub-Saharan Africa 
over the last 3 decades? (ii) How much aid would be needed to attain the First Millennium Development 
Goal (MDG#1) of cutting poverty in half by 2015? (iii) Taking proposed aid flows as given, how much 
would structural characteristics, such as domestic savings rates and productivity, have to change in order to 
reach the MDG#1? Our analysis indicates that, even under optimistic assumptions for the effectiveness of 
aid, past and future expectations for aid in fostering growth and poverty reduction have been too high. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
In September of 2000, world leaders met in New York to adopt a new framework for addressing the 
urgent needs of people in lesser developed countries. This Millennium Summit adopted eight 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), covering a wide range of issues such as health, education, 
gender equality, the environment and more. The First Millennium Development Goal (MDG#1) 
sought to “Eradicate Extreme Huger and Poverty.” A quantifiable target was set to measure 
progress toward that goal, namely the reduction by half of the global proportion of people living in 
extreme poverty in 1990 by the year 2015. The purpose of this paper is to offer a basic theoretical 
framework with which to analyze progress towards this goal.
1  
 
In some respects, this project is on schedule. Sala-i-Martin (2006) conducts an empirical study of 
the global income distribution and world poverty, concluding that 69% of the MDG#1 has already 
been achieved. However, this reduction in poverty has not been evenly distributed geographically, 
with the lion’s share of progress having been made in China and India. Most notably, Africa has 
lagged behind. Indeed, poverty rates in Africa increased slightly between 1990 and 2000. While 
justly celebrating the reduction of extreme poverty in many parts of Asia, few observers would feel 
that the MDG#1 can be said to have been achieved when an entire continent has been left behind. 
Therefore in our calculations below, regarding the costs associated with the achievement of 
MDG#1, our focus will be on Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
One of the fundamental justifications for development aid to poor countries is the potential it has for 
reducing poverty. Many analysts have proposed that aid can play a crucial role in fighting poverty, 
particularly in Africa. Of particular note has been the plan put forth by Sachs et al. (2004) and 
subsequently adopted by the UN. The plan argues that a “big push” is needed to spur growth and 
reduce poverty in Africa, with concordant increases in aid flows from developed countries. The 
relationship between growth and poverty is multi-faceted, but many studies have found a strong 
relationship between increases in per-capita GDP and the lowering of poverty (e.g., Ravallion, 
2001; Dollar and Kraay, 2002 and Besley and Burgess, 2003). Therefore, if a “big push” were to 
                                                 
1 The other target contemplated in the MDG#1 was to, in the same period, reduce by half the number of people who 
suffer from hunger. This part of the MDG#1 will not be addressed in the present paper.   - 3 - 
jump-start growth through a virtuous cycle of increasing income, investment and productivity, one 
could envision the achievement of the MDG#1 in Africa. 
 
However, the empirical literature on the effectiveness of aid in raising growth is mixed. Hansen and 
Tarp (2001) and Dalgaard et al. (2004) find modest, though significantly positive, effects of aid. 
The recent analysis by Clemens et al. (2004) claim a more substantial effect of aid, whereas Rajan 
and Subramanian (2005) fail to find a positive effect of aid on growth. Accordingly, since debate 
persists as to whether aid has a significant effect on growth in the first place (or as to the 
circumstances under which aid has a positive effect) it should be clear that no consensus exist as for 
the magnitude of its effect. It therefore seems infeasible, at this stage, to assess the aid costs of 
MDG#1 on the basis of the econometric literature. 
 
Consequently, this paper follows a different tack by adopting a theory-based calibration approach. 
This is in spirit of “development planning” as practiced by Leontieff (1963), Chenery and Stout 
(1966) and many others, forming the back-bone of theoretical support for aid flows in many 
development agencies, most prominently the World Bank (see Easterly, 1999). However, our 
approach differs from the traditional approaches in a number of key respects.  To see these 
differences clearly, consider Figure 1, which illustrates the principles of the development planning 
technique.  
 
We begin by assuming the economy in question is proceeding along a balanced growth path, at a 
constant (possibly very low) growth rate. The trajectory is labelled “old growth path” in Figure 1.  
A development planner would then either set a new target growth rate directly, or alternatively, a 
target income level to be reached within a specified amount of time (say T years from now, y(T)) 
thus implying a required target growth rate, given the initial condition (y(0)). Next, assume the 
aggregate production technology is linear in capital input, as in a Harrod-Domar model when 
capital is believed to be the limiting factor, or in an endogenous growth model of the AK-variety 
(e.g. Rebelo, 1991). Whatever its justification, this assumption entail that a permanent increase in 
the investment rate translates into permanently faster growth, i.e. increases the slope of the growth 
path permanently. As illustrated in Figure 1, the aid requirements would then correspond to the 
additional investments needed to put the economy on the “new growth path”, which ensures the 
target income level is reached within the stipulated time frame.    - 4 - 
 
A recent example of the use of this methodology is Deverajan et al. (2002). The authors determine a 
target GDP per capita level required to reach MDG#1 in 2015, and proceed to calibrate aid 
requirement for individual countries in the manner described above. The end result is an estimated 

















Figure 1: Development Planning 
 
It should be clear that a higher “aid investment rate” only leads to a permanently higher growth rate 
because the production technology is assumed to be “AK”, i.e. because of the absence of 
diminishing returns. This assumption was criticized almost immediately after the inception of 
development planning (see Allais (1963) comments on Leontieffs (1963) calculations). Much later, 
Jones (1995) launched an empirical attack on the AK theory of endogenous growth, observing that 
in the OECD economic growth has been very persistent over the last century, whereas investment 
rates have increased. Performing various time-series tests Jones reject the implied linear association 
between investment rates and economic growth. More recently, Easterly (1999) extends the critique   - 5 - 
using data from the poorest countries of the world.
 2 Easterly performs counterfactuals under the 
assumptions that aid-financed investments actually went into capital, and capital enabled higher 
income levels in the manner suggested by the linear technology. He finds that poor countries today 
are much too poor to be consistent with such a scenario.  
 
Another problematic, and theoretically related, assumption nested in development planning relates 
to the speed of adjustment from one steady state to the next. In development planning, changes in 
investment rates and aid flows induce the economy to instantaneously “jump” to a new steady state 
trajectory without any transitional dynamics, as represented by the “kink” in the figure. In other 
words, the assumption of past calibrations is that of an infinite rate of convergence to steady state. 
There is by now overwhelming empirical evidence that convergence is gradual (see e.g. Mankiw et 
al. , 1992; Caselli et al., 1996; Bond et al., 2001, Arellano, 2003). 
 
In light of this criticism, we modify the underlying growth framework. Our approach recognizes 
that capital is likely subject to diminishing returns. We also take into account that convergence from 
one steady state to the next is unlikely to be instantaneous. So while we perform an analysis with 
the same aim as development planning, the underlying theoretical framework is different. Instead of 
the Harrod-Domar/AK model, we adapt the Solow (1956) model as our organizing framework.  
 
Our baseline calibrations reveal that “aid requirements” are considerably larger than those 
commonly advertised. For Sub-Saharan Africa alone, the “price-tag” is easily twice the global 
requirements calculated by Deverajan et al. (2002). However, the analysis also indicates that aid 
requirements will vary, depending on the structural characterizes of the economy in question. For 
example, aid requirements will depend on domestic resource mobilization and the underlying 
productivity trend. As a result, we also perform calibrations with fixed flows of aid and ask how 
structural characteristics need to change, given those fixed amounts, in order to achieve the 
MDG#1. These exercises complement the recent debate about whether poor countries are in a 
“poverty trap” or not (e.g. Sachs et al., 2004; Kraay and Raddatz, 2006). Our analysis has no 
bearing on whether such traps exist or not. However, it can be informative about how “deep” they 
                                                 
2 Strictly speaking Easterly attacks the “two-gap” model, which has the Harrod-Domar framework at its base, rather 
than endogenous growth models. But since the underlying structure of the two models is the same, one could equally 
well see it as a criticism of “pure” AK models. That is, an endogenous growth model where the marginal product of 
capital is constant at all points in time.   - 6 - 
would have to be in order for the amounts of aid given to be able to reach the target of cutting 
poverty into half within the next decade. That is, if indeed aid pushes the economy out of, say, a 
“savings trap”, then how much of an increase in domestic investment effort would as a minimum be 
required, together with aid flows, to reach MDG#1? A similar exercise can be made with respect to 
a “productivity growth trap”.  
 
The plan for the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a description of the calibration; derivations 
are found in the appendix to the paper. Section 3 then uses the Solow model to examine the 
effectiveness of past aid donations, in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa. The Solow framework is 
shown to predict a rather modest impact from past aid donations. This resonates far better with 
actual experience on the continent than the dramatic impact suggested by the AK-approach. We 
then go on to present our baseline calibrations of future aid requirements for Sub-Saharan Africa, 
using a range of parameter values for key structural characteristics. In Section 4, we conduct 
calibrations examining under which circumstances changing domestic fundamentals along with aid 
inflows together may allow for a halving of poverty by 2015. Hence, in this section we allow for 
changes in structural characteristics like investment rates and the growth trend. Such changes could 
be motivated on the basis of theories that suggest Africa is stuck in a poverty trap, which could be 
broken upon a sufficient infusion of aid. Section 5 briefly discusses various extensions of the 
analysis, including the consequence of introducing endogenous savings. Section 6 offers concluding 
remarks.  
 
II.   BASIC FRAMEWORK 
Figure 2 shows how the aid calibration works when a Solow model is used as the underlying 
theoretical framework. As in development planning, we assume the economy initially is in steady 
state, labelled “old steady state trajectory”. The underlying rate of productivity growth, g, is kept 
exogenous and can be varied in the calibration.  
 
We begin by calibrating an increase in income per capita which ensures that the headcount ratio 
(i.e., the fraction of population living under the 1$ a day threshold) is reduced by half. The Solow 
model allows for the study of the evolution of mean income. Hence, the first thing we need to do is 
to specify an association between the headcount ratio and GDP per capita.  Following the empirical 
literature on the topic of poverty reduction (e.g., Ravallion, 2001; Bourguignon, 2002), we assume   - 7 - 
that an increase in GDP per capita of 1 percent leads to a decrease in the headcount rate by π 
percent.  For example, Ravallion (2001) find across a sample of developing countries that 2 π ≈ . 
But estimates of the “poverty elasticity” vary across countries and time, so we will invoke a range 
of them in the calculations below.
3 This procedure provides a target level of GDP per capita, which 






















Figure 2. An alternative approach to calibrating aid requirements 
 
 
In contrast with development planning, we do not assume that the economy instantaneously move 
from one steady state to the next; convergence is gradual. Consequently, we make use of the 
theoretically predicted path of GDP per capita off steady state, under the Solow model (labelled 
“adjustment path”). By pinning down parametrically how large a fraction of the distance between 
                                                 
3 As pointed out by Bourguignon (2002), the elasticity will in general depend on the characteristics of the underlying 
income distribution and the level of GDP per capita. Assuming a lognormal distribution of income, Bourguignon shows 
that the elasticity is increasing in the standard deviation of log income, and in the ratio between the poverty line and 
GDP per capita. Hence, whether the elasticity rises or declines in the medium run (the focus of our analysis) would 
depend on the changes in both the mean and variance of the distribution.    - 8 - 
the initial steady state and the future steady state which is traversed each year by the economy (i.e., 
the rate of convergence), we can work out exactly how big a “push” the economy will need so as to 
end up at the target level of GDP per capita, within a 10 year window. That is, we can calibrate the 
required increase in steady state income (labeled “new steady state trajectory” in Figure 2) which 
ensures the economy reaches the target, logy(T), in transition.  
 
Finally, we assume foreign aid comes in the shape of investment. This mirrors the assumption made 
in development planning exercises. In the Solow framework more investment will increase long run 
GDP per capita. How big of an increase in steady state labor productivity a given investment hike 
can produce depends on the extent of diminishing returns, which is parametrically fixed since we 
employ a Cobb-Douglas production function. As a result, we can back out how much additional aid 
investment is needed (in percent of GDP) to attain the target level of GDP per capita by t=T, and 
thereby the poverty target (labelled “increased investment effort”).  
 
To begin the calibrations, the assumption made regarding the poverty elasticity is clearly paramount 
in that it pins down the required increase in GDP per capita. Intuitively, as this elasticity is reduced 
the required increase in aid financed investments goes up.   
 
Second, the position of the initial steady state matters as well. In a standard Solow model an 





 percent, where α measures the curvature of the (Cobb-Douglas) production function; 
given competitive markets α can be associated with capital’s share in national accounts. In the 
present case, however, total investment comprises both an aid component and a component deriving 
from domestic resource mobilisation. The two forms of investment are assumed to be perfect 
substitutes. As a result, in order to produce a required increase in total investment of, say, x percent 
by way of foreign aid alone, it will matter how much the economy in question was investing to 
begin with. Intuitively, if domestic resource mobilisation were substantial, a larger increase in the 
aid investment rate is necessary, so as to obtain a required increase in the total investment rate 
(domestic plus aid financed) of x percent.  
   - 9 - 
In the appendix we show how this initial condition can be expressed in terms of parameters 
(population growth, productivity growth, depreciation) and the (initial) marginal product of capital 
(MPK). If initial domestic resource mobilisation is “small” the implied initial marginal product will 
be “large” (due to diminishing returns), and so less additional aid will be required. Conversely, a 
high initial rate of domestic resource mobilisation implies an initially “large” capital stock and 
therefore a low marginal product of capital. In this case, a relatively larger increase in aid 
investments will be needed. Of course, once we pick a marginal product a level of domestic 
resource mobilization is implied.  
 
Third, the curvature of the Cobb-Douglas production function matters since it stipulates how big of 
an increase in long-run income a given increase in investment will yield.  
 
Fourth, the assumption made regarding the underlying rate of productivity growth is directly 
important. After all, if the economy is growing rapidly along its original steady state trajectory it 
may be that no additional investment effort is needed. In the case of Sub-Saharan Africa, however, 
there is little evidence to suggest that productivity growth is substantial. 
 
Finally, the rate of convergence greatly influences calibrated aid requirements. Figure 3 illustrates 
this by depicting two scenarios involving “fast” and “slow” convergence, respectively.  As can be 
seen, if convergence is “slow” (the adjustment path is less steeply sloped), steady state income per 
capita will need to be raised more for a given income target to be reached in time, compared with 
the case where convergence is rapid. Importantly, the rate of convergence is not an exogenous 
constant in the Solow model (see e.g. Mankiw et al. 1992). It is analytically pinned down by the 
curvature on the production function, as well as productivity growth, population growth and the rate 
of capital depreciation. Hence, both α (capital’s share) and g (productivity growth), which will be 
varied in the calibrations below, also have an important indirect effect on aid requirements. Faster 
productivity growth will induce faster convergence to steady state. Accordingly, faster trend growth 
will be doubly useful in reaching poverty targets. It reduces the need for outside stimulus, as 
explained above, and it increases the rate of convergence, implying that less of an increase in steady 
state income is needed for a given income objective to be reached in time. Likewise, the rate of 
convergence is lowered if the tendency for diminishing returns is dampened, i.e. if the production 






















Figure 3. The impact of changes in the rate of convergence on aid requirements. 
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 (1) 
The notation, which we refer to below, is the following: dF/Y is the change in aid (dF) as a fraction 
of GDP (Y), π is the poverty elasticity, g is the productivity growth rate, T is set to 10 in the 
calibrations below, λ is the rate of convergence, α is capital’s share, n is population growth, δ is the 
rate of capital depreciation whereas MPK is the marginal product of capital in the initial steady 
state. The rate of convergence, λ, is formally related to the parameters of the model in the following 
way: λ = (1−α)(δ+n+g). Finally, our model allows for parts of the aid flow to potentially be 
                                                 
4 See also Dalgaard and Erickson (2006).   - 11 - 
“wasted”. This is captured by ϖ. Accordingly, ϖ=1 means that all aid flows are turned into 
investments. If instead ϖ<1, then some part of aid does not go towards capital formation; it could be 
dead-weight loss, it could go towards socially undesirable consumption (e.g., corruption by 
government officials) or to socially desirable consumption (e.g., disaster relief which doesn’t 
increase the capital stock).  
 
III.   BASELINE CALIBRATIONS 
A.   Evaluating the impact of past aid flows 
Before we start calibrating aid requirements for the future, it seems like a prudent check of the 
framework to do a little “back casting”. As demonstrated by Easterly (1999), the AK-based 
approach over predicts actual GDP per capita of aid-recipients to a rather extreme extent. Is the 
same true for the present Solow - based framework? 
 
To answer this question we focus on the Sub-Saharan region, where growth over the last 3 decades 
has been dismal, in spite of continuous infusions of aid. Figure 4 illustrates these facts.  
 
The figure comprises 30 Sub-Saharan African countries for the period 1970-2000, and shows the 
evolution of GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) and the aid to GDP ratio. The countries are 
chosen based on the criterion that data is available for all years.
5 GDP per capita in any year is 
defined at the sum of GDP in the 30 countries, divided by the sum of populations. Total aid in any 
given year is similarly calculated as the inflow to all the 30 countries.  In effect, therefore, we treat 
this group of countries as “one big country”. As seen, the period in question can be described as one 
of stagnation in living standards; GDP per capita actually fell slightly by roughly 2%. 
Simultaneously, aid inflows rose from about 2% of total GDP in 1970 to about 10% in the mid-90s 
after which it fell to around 5% of GDP as the millennium came to a close – roughly the average for 
the period.  
 
                                                 
5 The data source is the 2005 edition of World Development Indicators. “Aid” refers to ODA. The 30 countries are: 
Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Dem. Rep., Congo, Rep., 
Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, 





















































Figure 4. Aid inflows and growth in Sub-Sahara Africa 
 
 
To assess the growth implications of aid for this “country”, we begin by calculating the impact on 
steady state GDP per capita from a permanent increase in “aid investments” to 5 percent, starting at 
2 percent of GDP. We thereby match the initial “aid investment rate” and the average aid/GDP ratio 
for the period. Assuming the economy initially is in steady state, we can then project GDP per 
capita in 2000, using the predicted time path for GDP per capita, under the Solow model. Based on 
available data for the sample of countries under consideration, we employ a 3 percent rate of 
population growth (the average for 1970-2000), put g=0, δ=0.05 and impose s=0.12 (the domestic 
component of investment). The latter assumption implies, when ω=1, that the GDP share of gross 
capital formation at the end of the period is 0.17, in accordance with the evidence. Finally, suppose 
capital’s share is fairly large: ½. These assumptions imply a rate of convergence of 4 percent, which 
matches the finding of Hoeffler (2002) who fit the augmented Solow model to data pertaining to 
Africa in isolation.  
 
The “predicted” gain in GDP per worker from observed aid flows over the last 30 years is only 
slightly more than 7 percent. If we reduce capital’s share to 1/3, the gain in GDP per capita falls to a 
mere 4 percent, or, what amounts of an acceleration in average GDP per capita growth of roughly 
0.1 percent. Obviously, if parts of the aid inflow is not invested (so that ω is smaller than 1), the 
predicted gain is further reduced. 
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It is disturbing that GDP per capita has stagnated in Sub-Saharan Africa. But the above calculations 
suggest that under the neoclassical growth model this stagnation does not necessarily lead us to 
believe we are faced by an “aid effectiveness” puzzle. In the end, the amounts of aid given should 
not have been expected to make a dramatic difference, seen through the lenses of the neoclassical 
growth model. 
 
We believe these calculations illustrate that the Solow model is a plausible tool for forming priors 
about the impact from aid in an African context. Looking forward, we can ask how the model can 
inform us about the effects of future aid. Specifically, what combination of aid flows and 
parameters values that will enable the MDG #1 to be reached in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
B.   Calibrating aid requirements for the future 
 
Of the set of necessary parameters to be chosen, the expected population growth rate is probably the 
easiest to pin down. Throughout, we will use UN’s population growth projections for the period 
2005-2015 for Africa. Regardless of which variant we choose (low, medium, high), the population 
growth rate is about 1% per year on average.  
 
A second key input is the trend growth rate, g. As should be clear from Figure 3, there is little 
evidence of persistent growth in total factor productivity (TFP) in Sub-Saharan Africa, over the past 
30 years (see also Young, 2005). This would suggest that assuming a constant level of TFP would 
be a reasonable baseline assumption, which we therefore adopt. However, in the next section we 
will explore the consequences of an increase in the underlying productivity trend.  
 
A third input parameter to be chosen is the aggregate marginal product of capital (MPK) in Sub-
Sahara Africa. In this regard, we are not faced with an abundance of evidence on which to rely. 
However, a recent paper by Caselli and Feyrer (2006) calibrate marginal products for a cross 
section of countries, including 6 Sub-Saharan African countries: Botswana, Burundi, Congo, Cote 
d’Ivoire, South Africa and Zambia. Without adjustments for natural capital, the MPKs fall in range 
from 8 % (Burundi) to 24% (Botswana). If part of the compensation for capital in national accounts 
is assumed to be remuneration for natural resources, Caselli and Feyrer show that the MPKs are 
reduced to a range from 1% (Burundi) to 14% (Botswana). These estimates presume competitive   - 14 - 
markets and price taking behavior on the part of produces. If externalities are important, the private 
MPK and the social MPK can be different. (As discussed in Section 5, equation (1) remains valid if 
externalities are present.) In order to detect such effects, direct estimation is necessary. Such an 
analysis is conducted in Dalgaard and Hansen (2005), where the average aggregate marginal 
products across time and countries is estimated for a group of aid receiving countries, based on an 
observable (modified) growth accounting equation. According to this analysis, the average marginal 
product falls in a range from 20 to 30%. Dalgaard and Hansen find no evidence that “aid financed 
investments” are less productive than those financed by other sources (domestic resource 
mobilization, FDI). As a result, for the calibrations below we assume MPKs in a range from 10 to 
30 %, capturing the findings of these two studies in broad strokes.  
 
The fourth important input variable is capital’s share, which in theory parameterizes the curvature 
of the aggregate production function. The standard assumption in macroeconomics is to allow α to 
fall in a 1/3 to 0.4 range. However, in a recent study Kraay and Raddatz (2006) argue that 
somewhat higher values are appropriate for poor countries; they explore values of α in a .5 to .6 
range. The studies by Gollin (2002) and Caselli and Feyrer (2006) detect substantial cross-country 
variation in capital’s share, though not variation that seems to be systematic to levels of 
development. Accordingly we will allow α to fall in the range 1/3 to 0.6.  
 
Fifth, for our main calibrations we need to choose a poverty elasticity. A recent paper by Besley and 
Burgess (2003) is the most appropriate for present purposes, as it estimates π using poverty rates 
and GDP per capita. They find π = 0.75, with a standard deviation of 0.25, using data for the entire 
less developed world. When they confine attention to Sub-Saharan Africa the elasticity falls to 0.49 
(0.23). Hence, using the full sample estimate, Besley and Burgess’ study would suggest allowing π 
to fall in a range from 0.25 to 1.25, which engulfs the point estimate for Sub-Saharan Africa taken 
in isolation. Larger poverty elasticity’s are found in the literature, but typically when expenditures, 
rather than GDP per capita, are used as right hand side variable in the regression. Even though this 
does not correspond exactly to our specification, for completeness we will allow π to go as high as 
3, which is the upper limit to the estimate found by Ravallion (2001) on data including both income 
and expenditures.  
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Table 1 shows the results of the aid calibrations. In all cells we maintain a set of assumptions, which 
are reported at the bottom of the table. Notice in particular that we maintain ϖ=1 and MPK=0.2 in 
all reported calibrations. The reason is simply that an interested reader quickly can assess the 
consequences of changing these assumptions, as evident from equation (1). Both parameters enter 
the denominator of the expression, which means that simple multiplication of the reported aid 
requirements in the table is sufficient to get new results. For example, if ϖ=0.5 were to be 
considered more appropriate, all numbers in the dF/Y column should be multiplied by 2. Likewise, 
if MPK=0.3 is thought to be more relevant, all aid requirements should be multiplied by 2/3. 
>Table 1< 
In the first 18 rows the rate of convergence is endogenous. Accordingly if capital’s share is 
changed, the rate of convergence also responds. The implied rates of convergence are broadly 
consistent with Hoeffler (2002) estimates for Africa. Nevertheless, in the last 6 rows we decouple 
this link to see the effects of varying assumptions about λ. 
 
Turning to the results, it is clear that aid requirements are rather steep, especially if we use the 
poverty elasticity estimated by Besley and Burgess (0.75). If the poverty elasticity rises to its 
perceived upper limit, aid requirements are dramatically lowered, though remain large. For 
example, with a poverty elasticity of 2, dF/Y falls in a 37-49% range depending on the assumption 
about capital’s share. This amounts to a required increase in aid inflows to what Sachs et al. (2004) 
label “Tropical Sub-Saharan Africa” of between 76 and 100 billion US$ in the first year; total flows 
will subsequently have to increase over time so as to keep pace with GDP and maintain a constant 
aid to GDP ratio.
6  
 
Comparing the results for varying assumptions about α, it might at first seem odd that as capital’s 
share is increased, aid requirements increase. The explanation is, however, simple. A larger 
capital’s share will, on the one hand, imply less diminishing return to capital, which tends to make 
additional investment more able to expand long run income. On the other hand, however, less 
diminishing returns lowers the rate of convergence, which implies that the economy need a bigger 
                                                 
6 This range for aid requirements is based on pooled GDP data for 2002. Specifically, the countries included are: 
Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Dem. Rep., Congo, Rep., 
Cote d'Ivoire, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, 
Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.   - 16 - 
“push” to reach a given income target within 10 years time. Accordingly, with slower convergence 
more aid is needed for the fulfillment of MDG#1. As it turns out, the latter effect dominates, which 
explains why assuming a larger share of capital does not bring down the calibrated costs of halving 
poverty. 
 
The last 6 columns show the “pure” influence from the rate of convergence on the aid costs of 
MDG#1, in a setting where capital’s share is favorably chosen (from the perspective of aid 
effectiveness). The rate of convergence is an important variable, in that fast convergence at 10% 
lowers aid requirements considerably. The last row provides an example where λ is very large, 
mimicking one aspect of traditional development planning; immediate convergence.
7 This 
assumption would, in its own right, lower aid requirements significantly. This shows the importance 
of taking convergence into account when calibrations such as these is performed, and illustrates 
how the traditional assumption of infinitely fast adjustment have lead researchers and practitioners 
to overestimate the impact of aid on growth. 
 
The calibrations are useful in highlighting which structural characteristics are important for aid 
effectiveness in the context of poverty reduction. For example, our calculations are not very 
sensitive to assumptions about the extent of diminishing returns (α). Instead, the poverty elasticity 
is a key input. Accordingly, getting an accurate estimate for this parameter is of practical 
importance when forming reasonable priors about the impact from aid on poverty reduction in a 
specific context. 
 
The conclusion from these exercises is that aid inflows of realistic magnitudes are unlikely to 
ensure a halving of poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa, over the course of 10 years. As explained in the 
next section, currently contemplated aid flows to Tropical Sub-Saharan Africa amounts to an 
increase of about 12% of GDP, or 25 billion US$, well short of the 20-23% requirement calibrated 
above as a “best-case” scenario involving a poverty elasticity as high as 3. 
 
To get a sense of the difference between these two numbers, in terms of poverty reduction, we can 
calibrate the poverty reduction a 12% increase in the aid to GDP ratio might “buy”. In order to do 
                                                 
7 When λ=0.5, the term [1-e
-λT] in equation (1) is 0.99; associating this case with an “infinite rate of convergence” 
(where the term is 1 exactly) is therefore fairly reasonable.   - 17 - 
so, we begin by simulating the expected increase in GDP per capita, from 2005 to 2015, using the 
approach from Section 3A. In 2002 Tropical Sub-Saharan Africa received about 18 billion $ in aid, 
which amounts to roughly 9% of total GDP. Accordingly, suppose the aid component of invest 
increases from 9% to 21%, the domestic component is put at 0.1, n=0.01, g=0, α=0.5, ω=1 and 
δ=0.05 (the implied initial MPK is 20%). Under this set of assumptions we find an increase in GDP 
per worker, within the 10 year window, of roughly 14 percent. Accordingly, given a very high 
poverty elasticity of 3, the reduction in poverty is 32%, rather than the 50% target. However, if the 
poverty elasticity is 0.75, the 12% increase in the aid/GDP ratio will only be associated with a 9% 
reduction in the headcount ratio, ceteris paribus.  
  
IV.   DOMESTIC ADDITIONAL EFFORT, POVERTY TRAPS AND “TAKE OFF” 
In the calibrations above we assume that nothing changes in the aid receiving nations when aid 
flows into the country. That is, domestic savings, productivity growth, etc., remained unaffected by 
the outside stimulus. However, there are circumstances under which one, in theory, would expect 
aid inflows to induce change in key structural characteristics.  
 
Increased aid donations could be associated with some form of conditionality. As an example, one 
could imagine donors requesting reforms, aimed at stimulating private investment efforts; these 
could perhaps involve institutional reform aimed at providing more secure property rights, a crack-
down on corruption and so on. Increased domestic investment effort would naturally reduce the aid 
requirements for the attainment of MDG#1. Conversely, the amount of additional domestic effort 
needed (on top of managing aid inflows of course), would be a function of how much foreign 
assistance will be forthcoming. Hence we can do a simple calibration to assess this scenario, as 
illustrated in Figure 5. 
 
The basic idea is to infuse a fixed aid-investment rate into the economy. This means that we need 
priors about how much aid is likely to be forthcoming in the future, and we return to this issue 
below. For now, simply think about aid flows as exogenously given. Moreover, suppose this aid 
inflow is insufficient so as to ensure the economy reaches the target at time T, as illustrated in 
Figure 5. Then we can back out the needed increase in domestic investments which, together with 
aid, would allow the economy to reach y(T). Technically, this increase can be computed, using   - 18 - 
equation (1), as the discrepancy between the fixed aid inflow and the required increase in 























Figure 5. Division of labor: aid and domestic additional investment effort as partners in 
achieving MDG#1 
 
Observe that this calibrated increase will be a minimum requirement. The reason is that the 
calibration assumes that the domestic investment rate immediately rises to its new level. If reforms 
are gradual and only take effect over time, the required increase in the domestic investment rate 
would be greater for MDG#1 to be achieved within a fixed number of years.  
 
Aside from policy reform, there could be another cause for a sudden change in domestic investment 
effort. The most frequently cited reason is the existence of poverty traps. A plausible example 
would be the “savings-trap”. The idea is that, due to the presence of subsistence consumption, poor 
people save nothing, or next to nothing. As this implies a stagnating capital stock (at best) and 
therefore stagnating standards of living, the initial situation of low income and savings is 
perpetuated. This vicious circle can be broken, however, if income rises sufficiently (even if 
temporary). A higher level of income, perhaps attained through foreign aid, leads to savings, capital 
accumulation and rising income: the beginning of a virtuous circle. This idea has recently been 
advanced as a key element in explaining Africa’s dismal growth performance over the last half   - 19 - 
century and as a reason why aid inflows could have a large impact on prosperity (Sachs et al., 
2004). This diagnosis, however, has also been questioned (see Easterly, 2005; Kraay and Raddatz, 
2006). 
 
While our approach has no bearing on whether poverty traps exist or not, the present framework can 
address a related question. Supposing that Africa is in a poverty trap, how “deep” must that trap be 
in order for a given increase in aid inflows to be sufficient to cut poverty in half on the continent? 
 
From the perspective of the calibration discussed above, there is fundamentally no difference 
between an assumed increase in s due to policy reform, and an assumed increase in s because a 
country exits a poverty trap.
8 Hence, another way of interpreting the calibration depicted in Figure 5 
is that the additional domestic investment effort appears as the result of an escape from the poverty 
trap. The calibration therefore tells us how big of an increase would be necessary for aid, along with 
an escape-of-the-trap induced investment spurt, to allow the MDG#1 to be reached. Again, note that 
the calibrated “jump” in investments is an immediate one. So the experiments amount to asking the 
following question. Suppose aid is given and the economy immediately shifts into a high savings 
regime; how much of an increase in domestic savings and investments would be needed for the 
economy to achieve MDG#1, for given aid flows? 
 
To do these calibrations we need to specify an inflow of aid. This choice is unavoidably somewhat 
arbitrary. Given that many different levels of aid have been proposed, we will rely on aid flows 
called for by the most prominent plan for development of Africa, namely that of Sachs and 
associates, mentioned above. That is, we increase aid by $25 billion in Tropical Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Sachs et al. (2004) argue forcefully that Sub-Sahara Africa is in a savings poverty trap, and 
that this infusion of aid should allow the region to reach (among other goals) the MDG#1. 
Accordingly, our exercise can be viewed as delivering the required size of the poverty trap, so as to 
make this argument internally consistent under the assumptions of the basic neoclassical growth 
model.  
 
                                                 
8 In practice, of course, there is a major difference: In the former case some actual effort on the part of the government 
is required in the sense of reforms, in the latter case the investment increase will appear by itself.   - 20 - 
It should be emphasized that under the plan laid out in Sachs et al (2004) this $25 billion would not 
be used exclusively for direct capital accumulation. The plan contemplates myriad expenditures on 
education, health, etc., which we do not take into account here. Therefore, in using the $25 billion 
figure in this exercise we are effectively modeling an upper bar for the direct effect of the “Sachs 
plan” in capital accumulation. It is conceivable that some of the alternative uses of the $25 billion 
could have important indirect effects on capital accumulation. Accordingly, the calibrated increase 
in the domestic investment rate may be interpreted as resulting from these indirect effects, from 
exiting the poverty trap, or a combination of the two.
9  
 
We use data for 32 countries situated in what Sachs et al. (2004) refer to as Tropical Sub-Saharan 
Africa; this set excludes South Africa. Following the same procedure as in Section 3A, we pool all 
countries with respect to GDP and aid flows. Upon doing so we find that these countries received 
aid in what amounts to about 9 percent of total GDP in 2002. This corresponds to total aid flows of 
$18 billion. Accordingly, we assume this number is raised to $43 billion and is increased thereafter 
to maintain a constant ratio of aid to GDP of roughly 21%.  
 
Finally, we need to choose parameters from the ranges discussed in Section 3B. Accordingly, we set 
the marginal product at the highest value we consider (30%) and capital’s share to the lowest value 
in its range, 1/3. Thus, we are choosing values for these parameters which would generate the 
greatest reduction in poverty in response to aid flows, ceteris paribus. The other variables are set at 
the level assumed in Section 3, as summarized at the bottom of Table 2. The implied initial 
domestic savings rate and the implicit rate of convergence are also reported. 
> Table 2< 
Unsurprisingly, in light of our calibrations from Section 3, we generally find that the required 
increase in domestic savings/investment intensity is large. Staying within the range of poverty 
elasticity’s consistent with Besley and Burgess (2003) estimate, the smallest (minimum) increase in 
domestic investment effort is around 46%.
10 But if the poverty elasticity is considerably larger, 
reaching the upper limit of Ravallion’s (2001) findings, the required increase shrinks to 2 %. It is 
                                                 
9 Alternatively one could view expenditures on health and schooling as accumulation of another capital good, human 
capital. In Section 5 we discuss how our calibrations are affected if multiple capital goods are introduced. 
10The calibrations are unrestricted, as can be seen from row 1 of the table; it goes without saying that an increase in s of 
anything close to (or in excess of) 100% is meaningless for practical purposes.   - 21 - 
important to recall, however, that we assume aid flows are turned into savings/investment on a 1:1 
basis. Hence the last case would require a total increase in the savings/investment rate of 14% (aid 
flows plus additional domestic effort). 
 
How big of an increase in savings is a priori plausible? Rodrik (2000) examines the contours of 
what he labels “saving transitions”. That is, periods during which the savings rate of an economy 
rises to a sustained higher level. Rodrik define a saving transition as a scenario where (a three year 
moving average of) the savings rate increases by at least 5 percentage points over a 10 year period. 
Using this filter, Rodrik detects 20 such transitions (when excluding natural resource abundant 
economies from the sample), for the 1965-87 period. In this sample of countries, the median savings 
rate increases from 14 to 23 percent within a 5 year period, and further to 25% within a 10 year 
window. The most spectacular case, however, would be that of Lesotho in the 1970s, with an 
increase from 9 to 22 percent. Hence, there are no cases of savings transitions involving increases of 
more than 12-13 percentage points and taking place over relatively short periods of time during the 
second half of the 20
th century. 
 
As a result, we are inclined to believe that increases in domestic savings, of the magnitudes reported 
in Table 2, are unlikely to occur, poverty traps or not, since it would require a savings transition in 
the entire Sub-Saharan African region of historically unseen proportions.
11 
 
However, one can imagine further changes to occur, in domestic structural characteristics, 
following an infusion of aid. A more dramatic poverty traps story could involve the trend growth 
rate itself (g). That is, perhaps Sub-Saharan Africa is caught in a zero productivity growth trap, but 
upon a sufficient infusion of aid, productivity growth is ignited. One can imagine many possible 
channels by which this could occur: strengthening governance and the rule of law, greater 
technology transfer from developed countries or improvements in health or education.
12 Returning 
to the example of Sachs et al. (2004), many of the policies advocated are explicitly or implicitly 
                                                 
11 Rodrik (2000) finds evidence that aid inflows stimulate savings. According to his estimates roughly half the inflows 
are turned into savings. This could be taken to suggest that ϖ=0.5 would be roughly appropriate, rather than ϖ=1 as we 
assume in Tables 1 and 2.  
12 Here, we would only be considering improvements in health or education which would operate through increases in 
productivity. Alternatively, such improvements could be modeled as improving the stock of health or human capital. 
These will be discussed in Section 5.     - 22 - 
justified by appealing to their possible effects of productivity. As with savings-based poverty traps, 
Kraay and Raddatz (2006) find scant evidence for the existence of productivity-based poverty traps 
in Africa. Once again, whether or not such traps exist is well beyond the methodological scope of 
the present paper. However, we can examine the impact of a productivity take-off on the required 
savings hike, and thus the prospect of reaching MDG#1.   
 
Accordingly, we maintain the 12% of GDP increase in aid flows to Sub-Saharan Africa suggested 
in Sachs et. al. (2004). We then allow for productivity take-off’s of varying magnitude and calculate 
how these varying assumptions influences the required (immediate) increase in domestic investment 
effort. Accordingly, the present calculation can be seen as either a scenario where aid increases both 
the growth trend and the savings rate as a result of an emergence from a “generalized” poverty trap, 
or as the result of some deliberate policy choices in recipient countries. 
> Table 3< 
Results are reported in Table 3. As in Tables 1 and 2, we allow the poverty elasticity to vary. If π is 
about .75, one would need very large growth accelerations. As seen, increasing the underlying 
growth trend by 2% points is not sufficient for the simultaneously-required investment hike to fall 
to a reasonable size. That is, saving transitions of a magnitude which has been observed in poor 
countries during the last half of the 20
th century. However, if π is 2 a growth acceleration of about 
1.0%, combined with a total investment increase of about 12 percentage points would be enough to 
ensure MDG#1, under the model. This, at least, would correspond to a savings/investment boom of 
magnitudes observed in recent history.  
 
It is of course an open question whether the growth trend can be lifted in Sub-Saharan Africa as a 
result of aid inflows. The above calculations show that such acceleration would be critically 
important for the attainment of the stipulated goal of halving poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa within 
the next decade. If the trend does not move, the required saving transition becomes implausible for 
the contemplated increases in aid inflows. Moreover, reaching MDG#1 in Sub-Saharan Africa also 
critically depends on a strong relationship between growth and poverty reduction. A poverty-
elasticity around 2 is required.  
   - 23 - 
V.   EXTENSIONS 
In the preceding sections, we limited our analysis to the simpler versions of the Solow-model. What 
would be the effect of enriching this basic model to incorporate other effects? For example, suppose 
that there exist productivity externalities; greater investment leads to increases in productivity. 
Alternatively, the model could be extended to include multiple capital goods, such as physical and 
human capital, or public and private capital. However, modifying the basic model to include either 
of these features is essentially the same as increasing the capital share, α, in the basic Solow model, 
with corresponding increases in the marginal product of capital. Such changes are, however, 
unlikely to lead to substantially different results than those reported in Section 3 and 4.  As 
demonstrated in Section 3, the results are not very sensitive to the assumed share of capital, which 
we had varying from 1/3 to 0.6.  
 
Another possibility would be to offer a fuller, micro-founded account for savings behaviour: how 
would the effect of aid change if savings were determined endogenously? To consider this question, 
we first turn to the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans (RCK) model, in which a social planner or 
representative agent chooses an optimal consumption and savings path over time. It can be shown 
that allowing for endogenous savings in this form has dire implications for the effect of aid flows. If 
the rate of savings is already set to its optimal level, then new infusions of aid will simply be 
consumed and, hence, there will be no effect on growth or long-run poverty reduction. 
Alternatively, one could model endogenous savings using an Overlapping Generations Model 
(OLG) of the type pioneered by Diamond (1965). In this model, capital accumulation arises from 
the younger generation saving for retirement. If aid enters directly as extra capital, then the effect of 
aid on growth would be essentially the same as in the simple Solow model. However, if aid enters 
into the budget constraint the young, then some of the aid will be consumed and not saved; this 
would be equivalent to having a greater level of “waste” in the Solow model. 
 
The bottom line is that the inclusion of externalities, multiple capital goods or endogenous savings 
in the model does not make aid more effective at stimulating growth and reducing poverty. Indeed, 
in some cases the inclusion of these features actually diminishes the effectiveness of aid.
13    
 
                                                 
13 For a rigorous analytical treatment of these extensions, see Dalgaard and Erickson (2006).   - 24 - 
 
VI.   CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper has proposed a simple framework for examining the link between aid, growth and 
poverty reduction. The calibration approach is based on a Solow model. Using this framework to 
“back-cast” the effect of past aid flows to Sub-Saharan Africa fits the historically observed growth 
outcomes better than the alternative approach, which draws on the Harrod-Domar growth model. 
 
Under a range of reasonable parameters, the aid costs of ensuring the achievement of MDG#1 by 
2015 are very high. Even after augmenting the Solow model to consider savings-based poverty 
traps and productivity accelerations, we still find the prospect for achieving a reduction of poverty 
following the proscribed deadline and aid donations difficult. To reach the target income it is 
necessary for trend growth to rise substantially combined with a large increase in domestic 
investment effort. Even this scenario requires that all aid is invested without “waste” and that the 
marginal product of capital is high. We demonstrate that these results are robust to different micro-
foundational assumptions and to the inclusion of externalities and multiple capital goods. 
 
These results are not encouraging. The burden of poverty in Africa and other low-income countries 
is immense and our findings that aid may not be as effective in reducing that burden as other 
analyses have suggested is no cause for celebration. However, it would be a mistake to interpret our 
results as showing that aid is simply ineffective. Rather, our analysis suggests that aid does have the 
potential to have positive impacts on both growth and poverty. While these impacts may be modest 
in absolute terms, for very poor people small improvements in their material conditions may have 
much larger impacts on welfare. Moreover, the present paper by design does not consider potential 
effects of aid which do not lead to higher levels of growth but which nonetheless might have 
substantial welfare-improving outcomes. As an illustration, even if it were the case that eliminating 
malaria in a country had no effect on growth or poverty, surely an aid project which accomplished 
such a feat should not be judged a failure. 
 
The analysis offers, we believe, an improved framework for the debate on the effectiveness of aid 
and the prospects for achieving the MDG#1. By examining the combinations of models and 
parameter values which generate different levels of poverty reduction, we can illustrate the 
background assumptions implicit in varying claims for the effectiveness of aid. We believe that   - 25 - 
making those assumptions explicit, and therefore subject to evaluation, is important in its own right. 
In terms of direct policy implications, our methodology offers no definitive prescriptions, but does 
point towards some possible avenues for further investigation. Given reasonable parameters across 
a range of models, the direct effect of aid on capital accumulation to growth, with then growth 
leading to poverty reduction, does not by itself seem sufficient to reach the MDG#1 in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. A more promising avenue would be if aid were to enhance productivity growth, though 
whether such an effect could be achieved is open to doubt. Our results show a great sensitivity to 
varying the elasticity of poverty reduction to growth. Thus, perhaps further attention should be paid 
to focusing aid on projects which directly reduce poverty, either through targeting aid flows towards 
poor individuals or towards decreasing inequality. 
  
Possible extensions of this paper would include a richer modeling of the key relationship between 
inequality, growth and poverty reduction. Besley and Burgess (2003) find large effects of inequality 
in reducing poverty. If aid could have a effect on inequality (or if inequality falls as a country 
develops), the scope for poverty reduction could be strengthened. Thus, a potential extension to our 
approach would be to consider the effect of aid not just on mean income but also on the dispersion 
of income, following e.g. Stiglitz (1969). 
 
Finally, it bears some thought to revisit the empirical studies of aid discussed above in light of the 
paper’s findings. Our results indicate that the potential overall effect of aid on growth likely is 
modest. In terms of how aid is apportioned by donors, there is a clear and understandable tendency 
to allocate aid to countries which are most in need of it: poor, slow growing, countries. Of course, 
the empirical studies try to address this selection-bias in aid disbursements, but there are no easy 
solutions to the identification problem. Thus, under the assumption that this selection bias can not 
be completely controlled for and that the actual effect of aid on growth is relatively small, empirical 
estimations that aid has no effect on growth should come as no surprise. Indeed, they would be 
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Table 1: Aid Requirements for MDG#1  
Poverty elasticity (π)  Capital share (α)  dF/Y (% GDP)  Domestic inv.rate  λ 
0.75 0.6  901  0.18  0.024 
1 0.6  297     
1.25 0.6  149     
1.5 0.6  93     
2 0.6  49     
3  0.6  23       
0.75 0.4  365  0.12  0.036 
1 0.4  160     
1.25 0.4  95     
1.5 0.4  65     
2 0.4  39     
3  0.4  21       
0.75 0.33  310  0.10  0.04 
1 0.33  144     
1.25 0.33  88     
1.5 0.33  61     
2 0.33  37     
3  0.33  20       
1.25 0.6  244  0.18  0.02 
1.25 0.6  53    0.04 
1.25 0.6  29    0.06 
1.25 0.6  21    0.08 
1.25 0.6  17    0.1 
1.25 0.6  9    0.5 
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Table 2: Required increase in the domestic 
investment rate 
Poverty elasticity (π) 
Change in dom. Inv. Rate 







Assumptions: g=0, n=0.01, dF/Y=0.12, ϖ=1, α=1/3,   
MPK =0.3, T=10. 
Implicit initial s=0.07, 
implicit rate of convergence= 0.04. 
 
Table 3: Take-off, Savings Poverty Trap and MDG#1 







0.75 0  195 
0.75 0.5  135 
0.75 0.75  114 
0.75 1  96 
0.75 1.5  70 
0.75 2  52 
1 0  84 
1 0.5  58 
1 0.75  48 
1 1  40 
1 1.5  28 
1 2  19 
2 0  13 
2 0.5  6 
2 0.75  3 
2 1  * 
2 1.5  * 
2 2  * 
Assumptions: n=0.01, dF/Y=0.12, ϖ=1, α=1/3,  
MPK = 0.3, T=10, s=0.07. * Indicates that 
MDG#1 would be achieved without any change in S 
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APPENDIX: DERIVING EQUATION (1). We begin by assuming a simple link between the 
head count poverty rate (p), and income per capita (y) 
  , p y
π − ∝  (1) 
where π is a parameter which specifies how much poverty declines This equation gives a target 
increase in income per capita, to be attained within T periods (or years): 












Assume next, that the economy in question is in a vicinity of its future steady state, and it utilizes an 
aggregate production function of the Cobb-Douglas variety. Under these circumstances, it is well 
known (see e.g. Mankiw et al., 1992) that the evolution of GDP per efficiency units of labor,  y % , 
follows: 
  ( ) ( ) ( )
* log 1 log log 0 ,
tt yT e y e y
λλ −− =− + %% %  (3) 
where λ is the rate of convergence to steady state and 
* y %  is steady state GDP per efficiency units of 
labor. We note that the rate of convergence is given by:  ( )( ) 1, ng λα δ =− ++  where α is the 
capital-output elasticity from the (Cobb-Douglas) production function, n is the rate of population 





















To obtain equation (4) we have assumed that technological progress expands at a constant rate 
() () /, g At At = &  and that  ( ) ( ) ( ) / yt yt At ≡ % . Equations (2) and (4) tells us how much income per 
capita will have to increase, in the steady state, so as to reach the poverty target:  ( )
* /0 yy %%  can be 
interpreted as the required increase in steady state income (per efficiency units of labor), which 
ensures that the income target, and therefore poverty target, is reached within T years. 
That is, the transition equation for the capital stock, K(t) can be written 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ),1 , Kt It Ft Kt ϖδ ϖ = +− ≤ &  (5) 
where I(t) is domestically generated investments and F(t) is the aid inflow. The parameter ϖ is 
introduced to capture the potential for “waste”. Accordingly ϖ=1 means that all aid flows are turned   - 31 - 
into investments.  Next, assume I(t) (and savings) are given as a constant fraction s of total income, 
that the population grows at a constant rate n, and that the economy is closed (except to foreign 
assistance, of course). We also assume that the amount of foreign assistance is kept constant as a 
fraction of GDP,  () () . Ft fYt =⋅ so that we can treat f as the “aid investment rate”. Restated in 
efficiency units of labor the transition equation for capital reads 
  () ( ) () ( ) () , kt s f yt n g kt ϖδ
⋅
=+ −+ + %% %   
where  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) / kt Kt AtLt ≡ % . To complete the model, recall production function is Cobb-Douglas. 
Specifically:   () () () () ( ) () ()
1
. Yt Kt AtLt yt k t
α α α −
=⇔ = % %  It is now straight forward to derive the 
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 is the steady state K/Y ratio. The sum  f s ϖ + is total investment to GDP. We can 
now examine the impact of increasing aid investments on long run prosperity. Log differentiation of 















Now, suppose domestic resource mobilization is kept constant, so that ds =0. We can then restate 













which relates changes in the aid to GDP ratio to changes in long-run GDP per efficiency units of 
labor, and parameters of the model. To produce the formula stated in the text we insert the marginal 
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If we substitute the last expression into equation (8) we get 















Finally, observe that  ( ) ( )
** * /0 / 0 dy y y y y ⎡⎤ ≈− ⎣⎦ %% % % % . Substituting equation (4) we obtain the equation 
stated in the text.  